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In the wake of the 2016 Brexit and U.S. presidential elections, the 
major platform companies including Facebook (and Instagram), 
Google (and YouTube), and Twitter implemented significant changes 
in the scope of the products and services they offer as well as their 
policies for working in institutional politics, especially in the context 
of digital political advertising.1 For example, all three companies 
rolled out verification processes for political advertisers and ad 
databases for the public. Facebook ended commissions on political ad 
sales and its “embed” program with campaigns.2 Google placed 
restrictions on political microtargeting and Twitter ended political 
advertising entirely and placed restrictions on what it has named 
“cause-based” advertising.3  
 
This paper analyzes the policies and products of platform companies 
with respect to digital political advertising in the U.S. Our focus is on 
social media platforms (Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Snapchat, 
Reddit, and YouTube) and the advertising capabilities that you can 
access through them, as well as Google search and the Google display 
network. We chronicle the state of play in these policies and products, 
revealing the lack of standardization across these platform companies. 
Importantly, we ask what platforms appear to be solving for with 
respect to changes that are seemingly both designed to safeguard and 
strengthen democratic processes as well as protect these firms from 





1 Bridget Barrett & Daniel Kreiss, Platform Transience: Changes in Facebook’s 
Policies, Procedures, and Affordances in Global Electoral Politics, 8 INTERNET 
POL’Y REV. 22 (2019), https://policyreview.info/node/1446/pdf. 
2 Paresh Dave, Facebook to Drop On-Site Support for Political Campaigns, 
REUTERS (Sep. 21, 2018, 8:32 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-
election-usa-idUSKCN1M101Q [https://perma.cc/CM9C-G4VR]. 
3 Nancy Scola, Facebook Considering Limits on Targeted Campaign Ads, POLITICO, 
(Nov. 7, 2019, 8:58 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2019/11/07/facebook-
targeted-campaign-ad-limits-067550 [https://perma.cc/4LJ5-FWX7]; Scott Spencer, 
An Update on Our Political Ads Policy, GOOGLE: THE KEYWORD (Nov. 20, 2019), 
https://blog.google/technology/ads/update-our-political-ads-policy/ 
[https://perma.cc/786A-JBX2]. 




give for their changes and the effects these changes are likely to have, 
we examine the inevitable tradeoffs between different and often 
competing democratic values. This paper advances a set of 
recommendations for improving the transparency and consistency of 
digital political advertising across platforms while mapping different 
normative positions on the democratic ends that paid political 
promotions advance. 
 
We base these arguments on empirical research conducted over the 
past year analyzing the paid political content policies and advertising 
products of the major platform companies, in addition to the 
relationships between platforms and the field of political practitioners.4 
During this time period, our research team at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill Center for Information, Technology, and 
Public Life (CITAP) compiled comparative data on the products, 
services, and policies of platform companies in the context of digital 
political advertising, as well as relevant legislation at the federal and 
state level. A separate research group issued a report more broadly on 
digital political ethics that drew on interviews and a two-day workshop 
with digital political practitioners and platform company 
representatives. This group discussed digital political advertising 
extensively and outlined four broad ethical principles that should guide 
practice and policy in this space: prioritizing democratic participation, 
protecting election integrity, increasing transparency, and ensuring 
fairness and consistency in the application of rules governing political 
speech on platforms.5 
 
Based on this research, we argue that there is a significant lack of 
standardization in platform political ad policies and products. There 
are, for instance, highly variable definitions of what constitutes a 
political ad, with platforms (except Google) not defining political ads 
in the same terms as the Federal Election Commission (FEC). As a 





4 These reports and web resources can be found at https://citapdigitalpolitics.com/. 
5 JESSICA BALDWIN-PHILIPPI ET AL., DIGITAL POLITICAL ETHICS: ALIGNING 
PRINCIPLES WITH PRACTICE 3 (2020), https://citapdigitalpolitics.com/?page_id=1911.   




regulatory interventions is unnecessarily difficult. At the same time, 
there is a lack of standardization when it comes to political ad 
databases, and there is a limited connection between what these 
companies make public and FEC rules in other domains, such as 
television advertising. This ultimately hampers the transparency of the 
political sphere in the context of digital electioneering.6  
 
In the context of the lack of FEC rules or even guidance, new 
democratic issues have inevitably arisen with respect to platform roles 
in electoral politics. The final section of the paper reveals the 
democratic rationales that Facebook and Google specifically have 
espoused publicly in making significant changes to their political 
advertising policies and products, while also discussing how much of 
the change in platforms’ paid content policies and products have likely 
come in the context of platforms reacting to external stakeholders and 
journalistic scrutiny. 
 
These rationales are grounded in specific arguments relating to the 
potential harms posed by digital political advertising—such as the 
potential for misinformation and the lack of visibility into paid 
political speech—although they are often simply asserted and lack 
empirical grounding. Even as they have implemented these changes, 
we suggest that platforms might be solving for the wrong things, while 
recognizing that change inevitably involves trade-offs with other 
democratic values. To take one example here, while all the major 
platforms have rolled out new rules around things such as the 
verification of political advertisers to ensure they comply with federal 
and state laws, as they have done so they have unwittingly favored 
larger campaigns and consultancies and wealthier candidates that have 





6 See also Daphne Keller & Paddy Leerssen, Facts and Where to Find Them: 
Empirical Research on Internet Platforms and Content Moderation, in SOCIAL 
MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY: THE STATE OF THE FIELD AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM 
(N. Persily & J. Tucker, forthcoming 2020). See generally Abby K. Wood & Ann M. 
Ravel, Fool Me Once: Regulating Fake News and Other Online Advertising, 91 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1223 (2018). 




changing requirements, raising fundamental issues of electoral 
fairness. 
 
II. The Current State of Play: The Lack of Standardization in 
Platform Policies in the Context of Paid Political Speech 
 
The scope of digital political advertising policies and products that 
exist are dizzying across the leading platform companies. On one 
level, this diversity has afforded strategic political communicators with 
a much greater variety of means for appealing to the public than during 
the broadcast era of American politics. It has also lowered the costs of 
purchasing paid political speech, which scholars have shown has 
allowed a greater range of actors to engage in paid political 
advertising.7 Meanwhile, the sheer variety of ads and the diversity of 
the platforms that they run on has meant that engaging citizens in 
contexts that are meaningful to them is more likely. All of which 
suggests that digital political advertising promotes electoral 
participation.8 
 
To illustrate this diversity, we provide an overview of the major, 
accessible platform companies and the suite of different products and 
services they offer in the context of digital political advertising.  
 
Google Ads (including YouTube): Parent company Alphabet has 
multiple advertising-related products and platforms. Google Ads 
(previously AdWords) includes search engine advertisements, banner 
ads, video ads (including YouTube), and Gmail ads. Google’s Display 





7 Erika Franklin Fowler et al., Political Advertising Online and Offline (2018) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0c7a/78dda6d4308 
764e236b9c17f898213082151.pdf. 
8 See Katherine Haenschen & Jay Jennings, Mobilizing Millennial Voters with 
Targeted Internet Advertisements: A Field Experiment, 36(3) POL. COMM. 357 
(2019).  




buying ecosystem outside of Google-managed advertising inventory.9 
According to our research, Display & Video 360 has minimum 
spending requirements that make it inaccessible to smaller campaigns, 
so we do not include it in our analysis.  
 
Facebook and Instagram: Advertisements on Facebook, Instagram, 
Facebook’s Audience Network and Messenger are all run by boosting 
a post or in Facebook’s Ad Manager.10 Currently, political 
advertisements are not allowed on Facebook Audience Network or 
Messenger,11 leaving Facebook and Instagram as the primary carriers 
of political advertisements. The rules for advertising on these 
platforms are mostly the same, though ads on Instagram must follow 
Instagram’s Community Guidelines in addition to 
Facebook’s. Currently, WhatsApp (also owned by Facebook) does not 
carry ads.  
 
Reddit: Reddit’s advertising platform is significantly more limited than 
the other companies. Its barebones capabilities and ambiguous rules 
are likely why it has not been adopted by many advertisers and serves 
as an interesting point of comparison to Google, Facebook, and 
Instagram.  
 
Snapchat: Similar to Reddit, Snapchat’s smaller and younger user base 
compared with Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube has largely kept it 
from being widely used by political advertisers. However, its approach 







9 Google Display & Video 360, GOOGLE MARKETING PLATFORM, 
https://marketingplatform.google.com/ab 
out/display-video-360/ [https://perma.cc/TSS7-8SYQ]. 
10 Ads Manager, FACEBOOK FOR BUS., https://www.facebook.com/business/tools/ 
ads-manager [https://perma.cc/HT82-EREW].  
11 Ads About Social Issues, Elections, or Politics, FACEBOOK FOR BUS.,  
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/167836590566506?id=288762101909005 
[https://perma.cc/N5LB-TKRF].  




Twitter: Twitter has banned political advertising.12 But by defining 
what is prohibited “political content” and what is restricted “cause-
based” content, Twitter’s rules are an interesting and informative point 
of comparison.13 
 
Across these platforms, there are significant differences in policies and 
products when it comes to digital political advertising. To analyze this, 
we compiled existing public information on platform policies and 
contacted staffers at all the platforms to confirm our information 
(Facebook, Google, and Snapchat responded). 
 
As Table One reveals, at the time of this writing (April, 2020) there is 
a broad lack of standardization in a number of different platform 
political advertising policies. We focus here on what is especially 
problematic from the perspective of democratic elections; namely, 
definitions of political advertising. Google is the only company that 
limits its definition of “political” advertising to paid content that 
references candidates, government officials, parties, and ballot 
measures.14 Every other definition of “political” by platforms is 
comparatively much broader, including Facebook’s inclusion of “any 
social issue in any place where the ad is being run”15 and Reddit’s 





12 Jack Dorsey (@jack), TWITTER (Oct. 30, 2019, 4:05 PM), 
https://twitter.com/jack/status/1189634360472829952 [https://perma.cc/U3RB-
B5A4]. 
13 Cause-based Advertising Policy, TWITTER: BUS., 
https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies/restricted-content-policies/cause-
based-advertising.html [https://perma.cc/33P3-YSBD]; Political Content, TWITTER: 
BUS., https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies/prohibited-content-
policies/political-content.html [https://perma.cc/5AQN-JPSQ].  
14 See BRIDGET BARRETT, DANIEL KREISS, ASHLEY FOX, & TORI EKSTRAND, 
ADVERTISING ON PLATFORMS IN THE UNITED STATES: A BRIEF PRIMER (2020), 
https://citapdigitalpolitics.com/?page_id=33, for further discussion of each example 
platform.  
15 Advertising Policies, FACEBOOK, https://m.facebook.com/policies/ads/restricted 
_content/political [https://perma.cc/N3M2-U55Z]. 





Table One: Platform Political Advertising Policies in Comparative 
Perspective 





political issue.”16 While easier to enforce, Google’s definition makes 
its policies substantively different from those of other companies. For 
example, Google does not apply its political advertising policies to ads 
that touch on political issues without referencing candidates, 
government officials, parties or ballot measures; Facebook, Instagram, 
Reddit, Snapchat, and Twitter do.  
 
As a material consequence, this means that in practice such things as 
the disclosure of paid political content will be significantly different 
across platforms. Despite the lack of clear federal regulation or 
enforcement compelling them to do so, all platforms require “paid for 
by” information on any political advertisement.17 However, even 
though all platforms require information on who paid for political ads, 
their differing definitions of “political” mean that users on one 
platform may see “paid for by” on messages that users on another 
platform would not. The same applies for targeting restrictions specific 
to politics—what platforms define as political determines the targeting 
and data products that campaigns and causes will be able to avail 
themselves of across platforms. Meanwhile, differences in the scale of 
platforms likely shape the approaches they take for moderating 
political speech. Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube not only have 
over a billion users each, but their respective ad platforms (Facebook 









17 The FEC has been plagued by partisan gridlock and it is currently operating 
without the necessary number of members to meet quorum to make decisions. 
Daphne Thompson, The Long Wait for Updated FEC Rules for Internet Ad 
Disclaimers, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (June 19, 2019), 
https://campaignlegal.org/update/long-wait-updated-fec-rules-internet-ad-disclaimers 
[https://perma.cc/5XV5-4KHN]. 
18 John Clement, Global Social Networks Ranked by Number of Users, STATISTA 
(Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-
ranked-by-number-of-users/ [https://perma.cc/7CBJ-WJ7Z]; Nancy Kapoor, 2018 
PPC Industry Statistics, SOC. MEDIA TODAY (June 21, 2018), 




Reddit, Snapchat, and Twitter’s user bases and ad platforms pale in 
comparison. Reflecting this, Reddit and Snapchat require every 
political advertisement to go through human review and specifically 
cite that they do not necessarily follow their stated policies; they treat 
political ads on a case-by-case basis.19 On the other hand, Facebook, 
Google, and YouTube rely on an opaque combination of algorithmic 
screening and human review of political ads.20  
 
Differences in definitions of “political” in turn shapes which ads are 
included in the ad transparency databases that Facebook, Google, 
Twitter, and Snapchat rolled out since the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election in lieu of clear federal rules or guidelines. Facebook and 
Google began archiving political advertisements that ran on their 
platforms in May of 2018; Snapchat released its archive of political 
ads in September of 2019.21 These are voluntary efforts, and the 
companies maintain these databases at considerable effort and 
expense. However, each of these companies’ definition of “political” 
has substantially impacted what advertisements are made transparent 
to the public. In addition, the differing functionalities and data 
 
https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/2018-ppc-industry-statistics-
infographic/526250/ [https://perma.cc/Q7RH-DN9].  
19 See, e.g., Daniella Alscher, Reddit Ads: Everything you Need to Know, G2 
LEARNING HUB (Oct. 15, 2019), https://learn.g2.com/reddit-ads 
[https://perma.cc/57G3-VE58]; Erica Perry, 7 Things to Know About Snapchat’s 
New Advertising Opportunities, SOC. MEDIA WK. (June 21, 2016), 
https://socialmediaweek.org/blog/2016/06/snapchat-new-advertising/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q5H4-KFL3]. 
20 See, e.g., Cade Metz, How Facebook’s Ad System Works, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/technology/how-facebook-ads-
work.html [https://perma.cc/QX4X-R9PF].   
21 Lauren Amaio, Facebook’s Political Ads Archive is Live, GLOBAL STRATEGY 
GROUP (June 1, 2018), https://www.globalstrategygroup.com/2018/06/facebooks-
political-ads-archive-is-live/ [https://perma.cc/4HUC-GRCP]; Kerry Flynn, Snapchat 
Launches Political Ads Library as 2020 Election Ramps up, CNN (Sept. 15, 2019, 
4:21 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/15/tech/snapchat-political-ads/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/6A4N-MS8N]; Taylor Hatmaker, Google Releases a Searchable 
Database of US Political Ads, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 15, 2018, 3:04 PM), 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/08/15/google-political-ad-library/ 
[https://perma.cc/5XWJ-G5RC]. 




provided in the databases make comparing the data from them difficult 
and in some cases impossible.  
 
For example, as detailed above Facebook and Snapchat both use broad 
definitions of “political.”22 Because of this, their political ad libraries 
include ads about political issues such as global warming and the 
economy in addition to electoral ads about candidates or issue ads 
referencing state ballot measures. Google’s narrower definition of 
“political” means their database is limited to ads featuring federal and 
state officeholders or candidates, federal and state political parties, and 
state ballot measures. Therefore, ads about political issues run on 
Google that do not directly reference officials, parties, or ballot 
measures are not stored for public monitoring. What ads are included 
in each library is only the beginning of the differences. Snapchat 
includes the targeting that the advertiser selected in the platform in its 
ad library, meaning that one can see the interests, gender, age ranges, 
and geography (including postal code and radius targeting) that the 
advertiser was trying to reach, or if they brought their own audience 
segment to the platform (using list-matching). Facebook and Google 
only provide limited demographic and geographic breakdowns of who 
the ads reached—their own categories of impression data that they 
choose to make public—not who ads were actually targeted to. Google 
does not supply the website that advertisements drive to (while 
Facebook and Snapchat do), and Facebook does not include the likes, 
shares, or comments that posts received. Snapchat is the only library of 
the three to report how much money was spent on an advertisement 
and how many times it was delivered in exact numbers—Facebook 
and Google both only provide broad (and different) ranges. Ultimately, 
spending, delivery, targeting, and what the goal of the ads are all 






22 Facebook’s ad library includes all ads running across the platform company’s 










We believe there can be relatively clearer approaches relating to public 
disclosure, transparency, and the standardization of the data that 
platform companies make available to the public and other 
stakeholders of democratic elections in the context of digital political 
advertising. 
 
For other media, the FEC and the Federal Communication 
Commission together regulate political advertising and create a set of 
standards for evaluating it and making it public. For example, for 
broadcast and satellite communications there is a standard set of 
definitions of what constitutes “advertising” for legal purposes, rules 
about the ways that ads needed to be disclosed, and dictates for how 
they should be made available to the public to further the ends of 
electoral transparency.23 Part of the feasibility of these rules was the 
industry standardization of the technical formats of ads themselves, 
which was in part the result of conventions shared across broadcast 
and cable television advertisers.  
 
One challenge is that digital political advertising comes in hundreds of 
formats that are platform specific, for example Google search ads, 
Facebook sponsored posts, or Twitter promoted tweets. And, there are 
hundreds of actors with touch points in advertising networks that help 
place ads and buy audiences. At the same time, the FEC has generally 
failed to create a similar set of standard definitions of political 
advertising, rules for how ads should be disclosed, and requirements 
for making political promotional communications available to the 
public. For example, with respect to digital media, disclosure 
statements are required for “public communications placed for a fee on 
another person’s website” by political committees or those who 





23 ERIKA FRANKLIN FOWLER, MICHAEL M. FRANZ & TRAVIS N. RIDOUT, POLITICAL 
ADVERTISING IN THE UNITED STATES (2018). 




federal candidate or solicit a contribution.”24 However the FEC 
definition of “website” does not include apps and internet-connected 
devices like smart appliances.25 In addition, what is required of audio, 
graphic, and video content online is ambiguous since these formats do 
not fall neatly into the FEC’s existing categories.  
 
The lack of standards—when it comes to formats, delivery 
mechanisms, and definitions of political ads—raises clear democratic 
concerns over the clarity of the rules that govern digital political 
advertising, their transparency and justifications (or lack thereof), and 
ultimately the mechanisms for accountability stakeholders have over 
the decision making of platforms. To that end, we believe that there 
are a few steps that platforms and regulators can take to create more 
standards for digital political advertising to further public disclosure, 
transparency and, ultimately, democracy. 
 
First, there can be greater standardization in the definition of political 
ads. To date, each platform has essentially acted alone, making up 
their own definition as they go along. Even further, they have 
seemingly been reinventing the wheel, setting their own course 
without regard to definitional work performed by election law in the 
context of electioneering. The FEC, for instance, defines an 
“electioneering communication” as “any broadcast, cable or 
satellite communication that refers to a clearly identified federal 
candidate, is publicly distributed within 30 days of a primary or 60 
days of a general election and is targeted to the relevant electorate.”26 
This definition is remarkably similar to Google’s definition of 
“political” detailed above, and could serve as a standard for platform 
self-regulation here. Or, at the very least, if platforms choose to go 





24 Proposed Rules on Internet Communication Disclaimers and Definition of “Public 
Communication,” 83 Fed. Reg. 12864 (Proposed Mar. 26, 2018) (to be codified at 11 
C.F.R. pt. 100 and 110). 
25 Id. 
26 Making Electioneering Communications, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/help-
candidates-and-committees/other-filers/making-electioneering-communications/ 
[https://perma.cc/958L-WBUQ].                                                                                                           




advertisements that fit within this definition as such and then work to 
develop and defend an industry standard that can potentially govern all 
platforms in this space. Simply ignoring the existing legal frameworks 
to which other media are held accountable needlessly complicates 
researchers and the public’s ability to scrutinize political advertising 
on the same terms as traditional media.   
 
Second, and related, following from the lack of standardization 
relating to how platforms define “political,” there should be greater 
standardization around the disclosure of political ads and the 
transparency of paid political promotions. While platforms have done 
a laudable job developing their political ad transparency databases on a 
voluntary basis, the utility of these databases has been hampered by 
the lack of standardization across platforms. Basic categories of 
information differ across platforms, including different things being 
included entirely based on what is categorized as political. More 
broadly how data is reported is highly variable.27 As such, these 
differences in the transparency databases leave journalists, academics, 
and the public hamstrung in any attempts to understand the scope of 
digital political advertising or the influence operations at play online. 
 
If the goal of platform political ad transparency databases is to counter 
the personalized information environments fostered by digital media 
and micro-targeted advertising, platforms should provide the same 
level of transparency into political advertisements that journalists and 
the public have into older forms of media, specifically television and 





27 See Paddy Leerssen et al., Platform Ad Archives: Promises and Pitfalls, 8 
INTERNET POL’Y REV. (2019), https://policyreview.info/node/1421/pdf.  
28 Wood & Ravel, supra note 6, at 1256-7. Other experts and researchers have put 
forth guidelines for ad archives based on what is needed for high-quality research 
and developed frameworks for platform transparency. See Mozilla Foundation, 
Facebook and Google: This is What an Effective Ad Archive API Looks Like, 
MOZILLA BLOG (March 27, 2019), https://blog.mozilla.org/blog/2019/03/27 
/facebook-and-google-this-is-what-an-effective-ad-archive-api-looks-like/ 
[https://perma.cc/59WB-3Q24]. We support these recommendations as well, but here 
focus on what forms of digital ad transparency are needed for non-technical users. 




media campaigns; the audiences targeted could be deduced based on 
the television station and show ads were aired on, the time of day they 
aired, and the designated market area (DMA) they were seen in. To 
reach this same level of transparency as traditional media, the targeted 
audience for digital political ads must be made explicit given that 
geographic location, time, page, or website rarely reveal how an ad 
was targeted or which actual audiences it was displayed to. This would 
allow the public to have greater visibility into the communications of 
campaigns, rivals for the same office and contending parties would be 
better able to contest one another’s claims, and journalists could hold 
political advertisers accountable for false or inflammatory appeals as 
effectively as on television. Even further, platforms should strive to 
facilitate counter-speech around the micro-targeting of political 
advertisements to allay normative concerns. Broadly, in line with the 
transparency around traditional media buys, the aim should be to 
achieve similar clarity in spending, the dates and duration advertising 
ran, and the audiences that were purchased.  
 
Finally, platforms, especially Facebook and Google, can be clearer 
about the existing state of their policies and products in the context of 
digital political advertising. To construct our table on platform ad 
policies, for instance, we gathered everything we could find scattered 
on blogs, in policy documents, through help centers, on interfaces and 
posts on their platforms, from industry media coverage, and media 
stories regarding how Facebook (and Instagram), Google, Reddit, 
Snapchat, and Twitter have differentially embraced their roles as 
governors of paid political speech primarily from between September 
and December of 2019. This search had to occur because of, and was 
made considerably more difficult by, the fact that there was at times no 
one place to find the policies governing paid political communications 
on these platforms, policies often changed, and changes were often 
referred to in numerous parts of platform policy documents. 
Meanwhile, policies, and changes in policies, were sometimes 
announced directly to the media, while at other times they were simply 




placed on a company blog. Sometimes policy changes were not 
announced at all, or were released on a CEO’s personal Twitter feed.29 
 
IV. Democratic Tradeoffs 
 
Beyond disclosure and transparency, these platforms have been rapidly 
rolling out significant substantive changes not only in their policies, 
but also their political advertising products in the post-2016 
environment (See Table Two, data from April 2020). To take recent 
high profile examples, Twitter banned political advertising, Google 
announced major changes in what targeting capabilities would be 
allowed for political advertisers, and Reddit discretely updated its 
policies to ban advertising about state and local elections and ballot 
initiatives.30 Facebook adjusted its misinformation policy which now 
generally exempts political figures and their political ads from being 
fact checked and allows users to entirely opt-out of political ads and 
not participate in custom audience targeting.31 Meanwhile, Facebook, 
Google, Snapchat, and Twitter all continue to update and make 














29 See Dorsey, supra note 12.  
30 Kate Conger, Twitter Will Ban All Political Ads, C.E.O. Jack Dorsey Says, N.Y. 
TIMES (October 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/30/technology/twitter-
political-ads-ban.html [https://perma.cc/TUV8-SGQJ]; Spencer, supra note 3.  
31 Igor Bonifacic, Facebook’s Updated Ad Policy is Letting Politicians Post 
Misleading Ads (updated), ENGADGET (Oct. 3, 2019, 5:52 PM), 
https://www.engadget.com/2019/10/03/facebook-misinformation-political-ads/ 
[https://perma.cc/SEB2-AQW9]. 




Table Two: Platform Targeting Capabilities in Comparative 
Perspective 
 




In the pages that follow we outline some of the justifications that 
platforms have provided for their changes in digital political 
advertising and the democratic trade-offs they entail.  
 
Electoral safeguards versus fairness: The major social media and 
digital advertising platforms are accessible to both large and small 
advertisers. These platforms do not require human contact with the 
company to start running ads—advertisers can simply create an 
account and launch a campaign. And yet, as detailed above, since the 
2016 U.S. presidential election, all of the major platforms have rolled 
out extensive new measures to secure electoral integrity, especially 
verification systems and ad transparency databases. Each platform 
states that advertisers must follow U.S. law, which includes 
prohibitions on election interference by foreign entities. All of these 
things are designed to safeguard electoral systems. As Facebook stated 
in March 2019, “We’re committed to creating a new standard of 
transparency and authenticity for advertising.”32 The former is 
articulated through the idea that “[p]eople should know who is trying 
to influence their vote and advertisers shouldn’t be able to cover up 
who is paying for ads.”33 The latter is designed for “protecting the 
integrity of elections—preventing online advertising from being used 
for foreign interference.”34 
 
We believe that both of these things are absolutely necessary. 
Verification systems ensure that political advertisers are complying 
with federal law before they run ads, which is a safeguard against 





32 Satwik Shukla, A Better Way to Learn About Ads on Facebook, FACEBOOK: 
ABOUT (Mar. 28, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/03/a-better-way-to-learn-
about-ads/ [https://perma.cc/94LQ-2AL9]; Spencer, supra note 3.  
33 Katie Harbath, Updates to Ads About Social Issues, Elections or Politics in the US, 
FACEBOOK: ABOUT, (Aug. 28, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/08/updates-to-
ads-about-social-issues-elections-or-politics-in-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/2TPV-
MT73]. 
34 Richard Allan, Protecting Elections in the EU, FACEBOOK: ABOUT (Mar. 28, 
2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/03/ads-transparency-in-the-eu/ 
[https://perma.cc/497Z-AM6G]. 




potentially done, such as occurred during the 2016 election.35 The 
latter is an essential tool for transparency around electioneering, which 
we documented above. However, while these things are unqualified 
democratic goods, we also see tradeoffs. Verification efforts and 
requiring data from political advertisers for transparency databases 
help safeguard elections, but they simultaneously raise the cost of 
running digital political advertising, which as noted above is much 
more accessible to non-incumbents and non-elites than advertising 
during the broadcast, capital intensive era. As such, the unintended 
consequences of these otherwise democratically desirable changes 
might have the effect of privileging incumbents and large institutional 
actors such as professional consultancies over challengers and new 
entrants to the field. 
 
As platforms, states, and the federal government consider acting, local 
candidates running their first campaigns with their friends and family 
as their only staffers are attempting to navigate the same digital 
political advertising landscape as prominent consultancies such as 
Parscale Digital and Revolution Messaging. Stopping large, foreign 
influence campaigns from using paid speech to manipulate elections is 
important, but so too is helping local candidates reach their 
communities online and get out their message. 
 
Participation versus deliberation: In a series of tweets, Twitter CEO 
Jack Dorsey announced that his platform would be banning all forms 
of political advertising on October 30, 2019.36 Normatively, Dorsey 
pointed to the ways that “internet political ads present entirely new 
challenges to civic discourse,” including “unchecked misleading 
information . . . all at increasing velocity, sophistication, and 
overwhelming scale.”37 In addition, Dorsey argued that the reach of 
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What Dorsey claimed to be solving for revealed the democratic values 
that he was promoting, likely to the detriment of others. In his explicit 
concern with misinformation and implicit concern with manipulation 
(made clear in his favoring of organic overpaid speech), Dorsey 
reveals his understanding of democracy primarily in epistemological 
terms, especially with the quality of democratic deliberation. Namely, 
this reveals a concern with good information and an unpolluted public 
sphere where citizens can meet as equals to discuss matters of public 
concern. 
 
While this sounds non-controversial, it is worth considering in this 
context whether political ads on platforms are full of lies. And, to ask 
whether citizens weigh quality information, even in the best of 
circumstances, to arrive at democratic decisions? To start, often lost in 
debates over micro-targeting is the fact that our best available evidence 
suggests that digital political advertising is often more about 
mobilization and therefore democratic participation than persuasion, 
which is comparatively more difficult.38 As a recent comprehensive 
study found: “The primary impact of an increase in targeting precision 
appears to be to allow candidates to reach their supporters more 
efficiently.”39 As such, the rival democratic value with respect to 
political advertising is participation, and the normative concerns 
should be over polarization and social division, not the epistemological 
basis of public attitudes or democratic debate. For example, while we 
lack empirical data analyzing the extent to which digital political 
advertising contains false claims, we know from interviews with 
practitioners that their approach to digital political advertising is often 
premised on supporter identification, list-building, and mobilization.40 
This makes sense. During primaries, candidates will work to 
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intra-partisan factions. During general elections, candidates start from 
the fact that 90% of their partisans will vote with them regardless of 
who is on the ticket given party identification, and therefore will seek 
to turnout as many of their fellow partisans as they can. It is only after 
banking as many votes as they can that campaigns turn to the much 
harder work of persuasion, which is considerably more difficult.41 In 
this context, if implemented across platforms, bans on political 
advertising would likely harm democratic participation, while doing 
little to change the nature of public debate. 
 
Civil social solidarity versus in-group solidarity: Seemingly, in 
reaction to debates over micro-targeting, Google has recently moved to 
limit things such as the types of audiences that political advertisers can 
target to “age, gender, and general location (postal code level),” which 
also restricts the use of outside lists (which Facebook allows through 
its custom audiences).42 The company’s concern is two-fold. First, 
Google argued that “these changes will help promote confidence in 
digital political advertising and trust in electoral processes 
worldwide.”43 Second, along with the ads transparency database, the 
company had the desire for the “ads we serve to be transparent and 
widely available so that many voices can debate issues openly.”44 With 
these changes, it appears that one of the company’s concerns is that 
micro-targeting facilitates hidden, narrow, and potentially 
manipulative appeals and therefore incentivizes the most extremist 
content. In essence, restricting targeting forces campaigns to speak to 
wider audiences, thus reducing the efficiencies of digital ads, and 
incentivizes campaigns to appeal to a broader, more inclusive, form of 
civil social solidarity. 
 
While this seems compelling at first glance, it is clear that in the 
process of promoting broader campaign rhetoric through limited 
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of speech from political actors to smaller, more cohesive social groups 
that we would not only see as legitimate, but democratically desirable. 
For example, research has shown that mobilizational appeals that take 
into account an individual’s identity, the socio-cultural context, and 
the networks they are a part of are effective at raising voter turnout, 
especially for historically marginalized and disenfranchised voters.45 
Limits on micro-targeting make these contextual appeals all but 
impossible in favor of broader forms of social solidarity. As such, the 
trade-off of Google’s decision here comes with respect to narrowing 
the possibility of democratically desirable appeals to more narrowly-
defined social groups, for instance if the NAACP wanted to run 
advertising campaigns appealing to black voters to get them registered 
to vote, or immigration rights groups sought to make electoral appeals 
to Latino voters. In other words, the same affordances that enable the 
Trump campaign to deploy the rhetoric of “invasion” in ads targeted at 
those holding the most negative attitudes on immigration also enable 
other campaigns to mobilize historically marginalized groups.46 
 
Flawed paid political speech versus no paid political speech: As more 
states create digital political advertising laws, platforms will have to 
decide how to comply with state laws or if they would rather remove 
political advertising in those localities entirely.47 California, Maryland, 
New Jersey, New York, Washington, Wyoming, and Vermont have 
passed legislation requiring disclosures on political internet 
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New Jersey, Nevada, and Washington also require that platforms keep 
records of the political ads within these states.49 Each platform is 
careful to say that advertisers must follow state and local laws, but 
some have gone further in their restrictions on political ads in specific 
states. Facebook and Instagram prohibit state and local candidate and 
ballot measure advertisements in Washington, and Google prohibits 
them in Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, and Washington, evidently 
due to the record-keeping requirements.50 Reddit has banned all 
advertising for local and state elections and ballot measures, regardless 
of the state. Each of these platform bans only apply to ads that directly 
reference local and state races and ballot measures, thus still allowing 
issue and national election ads to run. 
 
Given the reactions from Facebook, Google, and Reddit so far, more 
states instituting record-keeping requirements of platforms without a 
uniform federal law may increase the likelihood that more platforms 
will ban state and local political advertisements. Indeed, this concern 
was recently raised in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit’s recent opinion on a challenge to Maryland’s record-keeping 
statute where Judge Wilkinson noted that the increased legal liability 
for platforms may make it financially prudent to simply stop accepting 
these ads.51  
 
Paid versus “organic” content: All of the above imply a tradeoff 
between policy and product changes that, while seemingly desirable on 
some democratic grounds, may limit the utility of paid political speech 
and shift the focus of campaigns and other strategic actors to organic 
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used to undermine democratic processes. Practitioners themselves 
point to the fact that organic content is far more problematic on 
democratic grounds given that extremist rhetoric and mis- and dis-
information proliferates online far more through organic shares than 
paid political advertising.52 Indeed, the irony is that paid political 
advertising can often be used to counter problematic organic speech.  
 
As many researchers of disinformation know, “organic” speech is 
often not as authentic and transparent as it may seem. Coordinated 
inauthentic behavior purchased from bots in addition to highly 
coordinated but still authentic behavior from strong supporters of 
candidates both muddy the line between organic and paid content.53 
Organic speech also poses far thornier problems for democracy given 
broad First Amendment protections of speech that puts limits on 
potential regulation and the free speech expectations users have for 
how platforms will treat non-paid political speech.54 As such, we 
believe that journalists, researchers, and platforms must consider what 
should be done in addition to what should not. The changes platforms 
are making, such as removing certain types of targeting, may only 
serve to limit legitimate paid political speech while manipulative, 
intentionally-deceptive political actors may still subvert systems 
through other, less-transparent means.  
 
Accountability versus reactivity: At the same time, while platforms 
rhetorically situate changes in terms of these democratic values, we 
also think that a good deal of policy change happens reactively in 
response to events and external pressure. There is a meaningful 
distinction between being accountable and being reactive. According 
to the Oxford English Dictionary, being “accountable” means “liable 
to be called to account or to answer for responsibilities and conduct; 
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answerable, responsible.”55 In contrast, to be “reactive” refers to: “In 
general use, that responds or reacts to a situation, event, etc.; esp. (of a 
person or organization) that reacts to existing circumstances, rather 
than anticipating or initiating new ones.”56 
 
The distinction is important. Being accountable means providing a 
clear and public framework for justifying decisions. In this case, it 
would mean justifying platform change on the basis of articulated 
normative understandings of democracy and empirical evidence on the 
workings of platforms—not just democratic rhetoric. The opposite, 
however, appears more often the case. Platforms have been highly 
reactive, especially to external crises, negative press, and public 
pressure. They appear to attempt to ameliorate bad news coverage and 
gain positive coverage through policy and product changes. This is 
likely not the only external pressure they are susceptible to. Civil 
society organizations and the research community also shape how they 
operate, as does the normative pressure exerted by lawmakers and 
regulators around the world, but the high profile set of scandals since 
the 2016 U.S. presidential election has been particularly important in 
shaping the policies and products of platforms. Central among these 
changes are the implementation of new verification requirements, 
content moderation processes and standards, ad transparency 
databases, and in some cases, bans on political advertising and limits 
on political micro-targeting.  
 
Given continued public pressure, state legislative action, and proposed 
federal legislation, it is clear that more changes are yet to come. It is 
hard to predict exactly what these platforms will do next in this 
context. The challenge is that there is little systematic way of 
determining what is driving change, it is difficult to find clear 
explanations of changes or confirm if no changes took place, and there 
is little accountability regarding platform policies and their 
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unclear definitions of harm, lack of clear empirical evidence, and 
reactive nature of change produces potentially problematic results.  
 
For example, not only is it often not clear what platforms are solving 
for when they make changes, as we detailed above there are inevitable 
trade-offs with respect to democratic values. To-date, although we 
have many assertions, we have lacked clear and uncontested, empirical 
evidence regarding the harms caused by digital political advertising on 
democratic processes.57 Even more, as we outline above, political 
advertising on platforms poses both democratic opportunities and 
threats simultaneously, and much of how people interpret and weigh 
these comes in the context of what they value and prioritize.58 While 
there is a wide area of consensus over things such as foreign 
interference in U.S. elections, there is much greater uncertainty over 
other potential harms and trade-offs between competing democratic 
values or goods. On this basis, it is not entirely clear what platforms 
should do to strengthen democracy and further its ends. Often, what is 
in the interest of democracy is not entirely clear, nor is what 




Ultimately, over the past two years of product changes and policy 
updates, we have seen platforms reactively swing from all-inclusive, 
mobilization-focused, and participation-enabling policies to more 
transparent, protective, and potentially speech-chilling ones. While 
Twitter and Google have attempted to promote deliberative democratic 
ideals while consequently sacrificing the tools that allow political 
actors to increase participation and mobilization, Facebook has chosen 
to keep political advertising and microtargeting capabilities despite 
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instituted policies and products that increase transparency into political 
advertising and give the public tools to hold advertisers accountable 
thus better ensuring election integrity, but these changes come with 
higher barriers to enter the political advertising market. During the 
2020 U.S. election cycle, tracking changes in platform policies and 
capabilities will be just as important as tracking political advertising 
itself. Federal regulation is needed not just to provide clear 
requirements for digital political advertising, but also standards and 
common definitions and language. There is great need to correct for 
the lack of standardization across platforms when it comes to policies 
and products, which has led to a deeply confusing political ad 
technology set of rules and functionalities for political practitioners, 
regulators, and journalists to navigate. For their part, platforms need to 
continue to increase transparency into their policies and decision-
making processes and police the use of their platforms to prevent the 
multiple failures of the 2016 election cycle, while also carefully 
weighing the potential consequences of the actions they do take.  We 
must not lose sight of the democratic goods that these digital tools are 
capable of as we combat their intentional misuse. Solutions cannot 
only focus on stopping abuses of these systems; they must also 
promote democratic ends.  
